A Critique of Critical Legal Studies' Claim of Legal Indeterminacy by Benitez, Ian Carlo Dapalla
 
 
 
 
 
A CRITIQUE OF THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES’  
CLAIM OF LEGAL INDETERMINACY 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the  
Division of Philosophy 
Department of Humanities 
College of Arts and Sciences 
University of the Philippines Los Baños 
 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the degree of 
Bachelor of Arts  
in Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
 
IAN CARLO DAPALLA BENITEZ 
 
 
 
 
 
JUNE 2015 
 
 
 
The thesis hereto entitled A Critique of Critical Legal Studies’ Claim of Legal 
Indeterminacy presented and submitted by Ian Carlo Dapalla Benitez in partial 
fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy is hereby 
accepted. 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
NICOLO MASAKAYAN 
ADVISER 
 
___________ 
Date Signed 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
JOHN IAN BOONGALING 
CRITIC 
 
___________ 
Date Signed 
 
 
__________________________________ 
LEONORA M. FAJUTAGANA 
CHAIR 
Department of Humanities 
 
___________ 
Date Signed 
 
 
Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy 
 
 
_________________________________ 
FELINO P. LANSIGAN 
DEAN 
College of Arts and Sciences 
University of the Philippines Los Baños 
 
___________ 
Date Signed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAÑOS 
 
 
 
 
A CRITIQUE OF THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES’ 
CLAIM OF LEGAL INDETERMINACY  
 
 
 
 
 
IAN CARLO DAPALLA BENITEZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Permission is given for the following people to have access to this thesis: 
Available to the general public Yes 
Available only after consultation with the author/thesis adviser No 
Available only to those bound by confidentiality agreement No 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 Student’s Signature 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 Thesis Adviser’s Signature 
 
 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
 
Ian Carlo Dapalla Benitez is a graduate of Bachelor 
of Arts in Philosophy at the University of the 
Philippines – Los Baños in Laguna. Born in Valenzuela 
City, Metro Manila, November 2, 1994, he currently 
lives in Canlubang, Calamba City, Laguna. 
He graduated as the class salutatorian in Asian 
Computer College, Mayapa, Calamba City, his 
secondary school. Consequently, he is now the 
representative of his batch for the Asian Computer College – Alumni Association.    
He has been a member of the UPLB Sophia Circle, a premiere academic organization for 
philosophy students and enthusiasts. He became the Head of the Publications Committee 
of the said organization on March 2013 to 2014. Throughout his college years, he worked 
as a student assistant at the UPLB Gender Center, a government office that addresses 
gender concerns, instruction, research, extension, and services avert incidence of sexual 
harassments.  
His research in legal philosophy was inspired by his desire for the legal realm. He plans to 
take further steps to be an internal part of law as he enters law school.      
  
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
Foremost, I would like to express gratitude to my adviser, Prof. Nicolo Masakayan, for 
the continuous support, patience, motivation, and immense knowledge. I would also like 
to thank Prof. John Ian Boongaling as my critic, and the rest of the thesis committee: 
Prof. Marlon Lat and Dr. Nicolito Gianan. Likewise, thank you to all my philosophy 
professors for all the enlightenment: Prof. Abbie Kwe, Ms. Aleli Caraan, Prof. Nikolous 
Jireh Aranas, Prof. Mylah Nazario, and Prof. Pamela Ann Boongaling.   
To my beloved organization, UPLB Sophia Circle, thank you. Open your eyes. 
JM, Tricia, Lou, Kathy, Beo, Ronnie, Dani, Jai, Pat, Marvel. My friends, my squad, 
thank you for the stimulating discussions, sleepless nights, procrastinations, intoxications, 
and for all the fun and bore we had in the last four years ad infinitum. Thank you for the 
friendship.  
To Ask Philosophy Reddit Community thank you for the stimulating discussions and 
valuable insights.  
Wayne, our cute pet, thank you, for you are a great stress reliever.  
Lea Danielle Bacares Aguillon, my significant other, thank you for the love. Thank you 
for the endless care, understanding, motivation, insights, and for everything.  
Carlo Mateo Benitez and Imelda Dapalla Benitez thank you for all the support.  
Again, thank you.  
Ian Carlo Dapalla Benitez 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper challenges the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) claims of legal indeterminacy. It 
shall use a legal formalist logic and language as its main assertion, further maintaining that 
the CLS claims is only grounded in ambiguity and confusion.  
CLS is a legal theory that challenges and overturns accepted norms and standards 
in legal theory and practice. They maintained that law in the historical and contemporary 
society has an alleged impartiality, and it is used as a tool of privilege and power – law is 
politics. Consequently, CLS maintained that these results to indeterminacy of law. Legal 
indeterminacy can be summed up as contrary to the common understanding that legal 
materials, statutes and case law, do not really answer legal disputes. Legal principles and 
doctrines, as CLS scholars claim, are said to be indeterminate, for it is riddle with gaps, 
conflicts, and anomalies that are widely present even in simple cases. Legal indeterminacy 
also rises because of the underlying political power – law is politics – that implicates law 
as merely a tool for oppression.  
This thesis shows that CLS assertions with legal indeterminacy is only grounded 
on ambiguity. On one hand, using the main concept of legal formalist logic and language 
grounded with sub-arguments: inherent generality of legal language, reasoned elaboration, 
and neutral principles, it refutes the CLS claims of legal indeterminacy.  On the other, the 
paper maintains that their main reason of legal indeterminacy, ‘law is politics’, is merely a 
statement of fact that currently happens in society is sentimental and weak through 
counterexamples.  
Keywords:  law, jurisprudence, philosophy, CLS, critical legal studies, indeterminacy 
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
  
This paper challenges the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) claims of legal indeterminacy. It 
shall use a legal formalist logic and language as its main assertion, further maintaining that 
the CLS claims is only grounded in ambiguity and confusion. The paper will also refute 
CLS main ground for claiming legal indeterminacy, the concept of ‘law is politics’, by 
offering counterexamples.   
CLS is a legal theory that challenges and overturns accepted norms and standards 
in legal theory and practice. They maintained that law in the historical and contemporary 
society has an alleged impartiality, and it is used as a tool of privilege and power. 
  CLS is a kind of postmodern theory of law, the philosophical study of law within 
the scopes of postmodern theoretical outline: poststructuralist, neo-pragmatist, or post-
Freudian psychoanalysis. Together with CLS, postmodern theories of law also includes 
‘work within law and society theory, law and literature studies, sociological jurisprudence, 
semiotic legal theory, feminist jurisprudence, and critical race theory’1. Furthermore, these 
theories view modernist theories of law ‘as incoherent, descriptively inadequate, or 
normatively problematic, and incapable of securing freedom, equality, and justice’2. In
                                                          
1 David A. Reidy, “Postmodern Philosophy of Law, The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopaedia, Vol. II, ed. 
by Christopher Barry Gray (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1999) 674. 
2 Ibid. 674 
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 addition, they also tend to be ‘non-comprehensive, culturally and historically specific, 
interdisciplinary, rhetorically ambitious, and overtly political’3.  
Living in a pluralistic society, maintained by postmodern theory, means differences 
of the collective from wealth, gender, ethnicity, etc. In many instances, these differences 
often lead to conflicts. According to Chambliss and Seidman, the myth is that the state does 
not take sides, that it is neutral. The legal order is a self-serving system to maintain power 
and privilege4. This position is very different from Natural Law and Legal Positivism. In 
contrast to postmodern theories of law, there is a universal acceptance and agreement on 
what laws should be. However, the myth claims that powerful groups impose their will 
upon the collective by controlling the law inside a certain society.  
Legal Realists assert that judges hold the key to the influence of law. They further 
claimed that judges are guided by their interpretation of the law; however, being human 
means being influenced by other factors such as feelings, moods, alliances, and 
preferences. They highlight the fundamental importance of personality in the outcome of 
dispute. The CLS scholars used the ideas and legacy of Legal Realism that sought to 
challenge the existing convention in the legal system.5   
Legal Realism is a school of legal philosophy that is generally connected with the 
attack on the orthodox and conventional claims of late 19th century classical legal thought 
in the United States6. Its most important legacy, the challenge to the classical legal claim 
                                                          
3 Ibid.  
4 William J. Chambliss and Robert B. Seidman. Law, Order, and Power. (Boston: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Co., 1971)  
5 Brian Leiter, “American Legal Realism”, The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 
eds. W. Edmindon & M. Golding (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003)  
6 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2012) p. 595 
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that legal reasoning was separated and autonomous from moral and political discourse, was 
then used further and improved by the Critical Legal Studies.  
CLS began in the mid-1970s with its early proponents from Harvard Law School 
faculty. In the beginning, many proponents of the American CLS scholars are into the legal 
education. By that time, they were influenced by their experiences from different 
movements: civil rights movements, women’s rights movements, and the anti-war 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s. From these different protests against the domestic 
politics, CLS started off and eventually translated into a critical stance towards the 
dominant legal ideology of the modern Western society. Both the British and American 
version started roughly at the same time.7 They both wanted to explain what is wrong in 
the legal thought and practice.  
The movement operated around a number of conferences held annually, particularly 
the Critical Legal Conference and the National Critical Lawyers Group. Since then CLS 
has steadily grown in influence and permanently changed the landscape of legal theory. 
Among the noted CLS theorists are Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Robert W. Gordon, 
Morton J. Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, and Katharine A. MacKinnon.8 
 Like most schools and movements, CLS has not produced a single, monumental 
body of thought. Although there are several common themes and subjects that can be traced 
on different adherents’ works. The first theme is that legal materials, such as statutes and 
case law, do not totally determine the result of legal disputes. Second is the idea that ‘law 
                                                          
7 Legal Information Institute, Cornell University. “Critical Legal Studies: An Overview”. Wex Legal 
Dictionary and Encyclopedia. Cornell Law School, Cornell University. 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/critical_legal_theory 
8 Ibid. 
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is politics’. The arguments take aim at the positivist conception of law being separated 
from politics and morality. Third is the traditional claim is that far more often than is 
usually suspected, the law tends to serve the interests of the wealthy and powerful by 
protecting them against the demands of the poor and the subaltern, women, ethnic 
minorities, working class, indigenous people, disabled, homosexuals, etc., for greater 
‘justice’. Fourth are the claims that legal materials are inherently contradictory. Finally, 
they question the central assumption of law that an individual, a judge or a lawyer, is an 
autonomous individual. That they are able to make unbiased decisions based on reason 
detached from political, social, or economic constraints. CLS scholars hold that individuals 
are intrinsically tied to their epoch, socio-economic class, gender, race, and other 
conditions of life, temporary or permanently. Therefore, they question the idea of ‘free’ 
and partial decision-making. 
However, as stated earlier, CLS, as a legal theory, shows different weaknesses as a 
critique of the legal system. One of their main claims states that due to the politics of law, 
its contradictory character, and other external factors, law becomes indeterminate. 
Nevertheless, this claim is grounded on the ambiguity of conflations, ideas, and concepts.  
This thesis will use a legal formalist logic and language critique of CLS claims of 
legal indeterminacy. It maintains that laws are inherently objective, stable, and therefore 
determinate. It states that the CLS claims of legal indeterminacy is excessive, using a legal 
formalist logic and language as the main counter-argument, backed by grounds as follows: 
inherent generality and neutrality of legal codes, reasoned elaboration, centrality and 
institutionalized process. In addition, this thesis will also refute the main premise of CLS 
claims of legal indeterminacy, which is the assertion that ‘law is politics’. It will be done 
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through offering counterexamples that will uphold law as an entity that is not purely 
politics.  
The idea of ‘formalist’ throughout the thesis does not exclusively implies to the 
school of legal formalism, for it means a ‘strict adherence’ or ‘observance of’. Although it 
will not dwell on CLS concerning its postmodern approach and view, it will discuss the 
weaknesses of postmodernism applied to legal jurisprudence, to serve as a supplementary 
critique to its flaws. Again, the critique’s focus is on CLS main assertions on legal 
indeterminacy, concentrating on the legal theory they proposed.  
Correspondingly, the aim of this paper is to use CLS theory’s potential. Their 
approach or way of looking into the nature of law can be used to develop a viable 
alternative theorization that is capable of providing a new direction for legal scholarship 
and legal institutions as a whole. Moreover, in showing the weaknesses and strengths of 
CLS, the paper will offer a resolution that will further answer the problem with the legal 
system as whole.  
This thesis also offers examples of statutes, laws, and legal cases in the Philippine 
context. These examples will further help the reader in contextualizing the theories posited 
by the paper.  
For further elucidation, an overview of each chapter follows:  
After the introduction on the first chapter, the second chapter exemplifies the current CLS 
movement’s knowledge, substantive arguments, as well as theoretical and methodological 
contributions. In addition, it also shows the concepts, views, subjects, and themes that the 
CLS movement has, by tracing them from the existing adherent works. It starts with the 
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impression of postmodernism using a chapter on postmodern legal theories from 
Emmanuel Fernando’s A Course on Legal Theory. A brief analysis of the most prominent 
forerunners of Legal Realist thought, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and one of his main 
works, The Common Law follows. This is succeeded by a brief examination of Roberto 
Unger’s major works, as one of the most valued proponent of the movement, The Universal 
History of Legal Thought, Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory, 
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, and What Should Legal Analysis Become? Then, the 
discussion narrows down to the CLS main assertions, its grounds, claims, and warrant, 
concerning their statement of law as indeterminate and purely political.   
The third chapter states the paper’s main arguments against the CLS movement’s 
claim of legal indeterminacy. This paper will show that CLS assertions are based on 
ambiguity. On one hand, their claim of legal indeterminacy is founded only in a confusion 
between generality and contradictory. The paper uses arguments that moves around with 
the idea of legal formalism, logic, and language. It is then backed up by sub-arguments that 
will further support the main assertion of legal formalist logic and language, which includes 
inherent generality and neutrality of legal language, institutionalized and centralized 
process, and reasoned elaboration. On this chapter, the paper also refutes the CLS main 
grounds for legal indeterminacy, the idea of ‘law is politics’, through counterexamples. 
Further claiming that the idea is merely a statement of fact that currently happens in society 
and further using it as a ground for legal indeterminacy is sentimental and weak.  
The last part offers the conclusion that CLS failed in demonstrating the 
indeterminacy of law. This is done by refuting their claim of contradictions in law through 
legal formalism. Then, with the use of legal formalist logic and language, together with the 
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sub-arguments: ‘reasoned elaboration’, inherent generality and neutrality of legal 
language, centralized and institutionalized process and settlement, this thesis refutes the 
claim of personal, partial, and subjective legal decisions. Nevertheless, it still considers 
CLS as a legitimate legal theory, and that it can be used as a viable theory for the 
advancement and benefit of the jurisprudence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) began with the concept and ideas of postmodernism. The 
postmodern legal theory sought to dismantle the meta-narratives of modernity, which in 
this case is the legal institution as a whole. They want to ‘disrupt the foundations of the 
now conventional, comforting certainties.’9 In this situation the ‘comforting certainties’ are 
the theories that includes legal positivism and natural law theory which offers a certain 
definition and nature of law.  
This paper will focus on the CLS’ claims of legal indeterminacy and legal 
impartiality as the main point of the critique. Postmodernism with its externality and anti-
foundationalist character can also be used in analysing the CLS’ claims against legal 
institutions.     
Positive and Negative Jurisprudence 
An overview of the postmodernism legal theory will help, for this is the style and character 
of CLS. Emmanuel Fernando examined the general orientation of postmodern legal theory 
as a collective movement in legal studies. He contrasted the postmodern approach to legal 
theory with the approach taken in Anglo-American legal theory. Fernando claimed that the 
postmodern approach is excessively external and anti-foundationalist. He added that the
                                                          
9 Emmanuel Fernando, A Course on Legal Theory (Manila:Rex Book Store, 2011) p. 923 
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 modern approach also ends the nagging problem of infinite regress, which haunts all 
efforts to establish a political or legal platform10.  
Fernando maintained that one critique of postmodernism is its ‘destructive 
character’, and it offers nothing or hardly anything constructive.11 However, this kind of 
approach against the CLS seems futile, since CLS is a postmodern legal theory. It means 
that this kind of legal theory does not really offer any structural framework of what is, it 
only criticizes the existing conventions, and it will be up to the individuals to formulate 
their solution about the criticized aspect of the subject. 
 Fernando coined the positive and negative jurisprudence in assessing postmodern 
legal theory. On one hand, positive jurisprudence ‘refers to any legal theory which provides 
a basis for judicial action in a particular case or situation and/or recommends the basic 
structures for a just state’12. It specifically demands justice in particular legal controversies 
such as abortion, affirmative action, privacy, and the proper extent of taxation. In addition, 
it also suggests the nature of laws as a social phenomenon, and how decisions should be 
made in particular cases. Their work is positive in the sense that they offer a ‘normative 
framework for future action by legislators and judges’.13 
  On the other hand, negative jurisprudence operates critical insights about the law, 
but it does not offer a positive plan for action. CLS stands on this realm of jurisprudence, 
for it only criticizes the existing notion of law, but it does not offer any plan of action. This 
is also where the critique of externality is founded.  
                                                          
10 Ibid. p. 942 
11 Ibid. p. 983 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. p. 984 
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 The issue then is which is better between the two approaches: positive or negative 
jurisprudence. CLS scholars claim that it is better to replace normative appeals with 
‘description and criticism’ together with a more critical approach to law.14 However, as 
claimed by Fernando, normativity may be partially correct at some point, but positive 
jurisprudence is more essential. He added that CLS scholars who analyse the normative 
conceptions tend to also use the concepts they ridicule i.e. justice, fairness etc. Therefore, 
due to the lack of foundation, they lean towards a foundation unintentionally, which then 
results to a sort of contradiction. In addition, another reason stated by Fernando in support 
of positive jurisprudence is that legal decisions are made internally, and not by 
revolutionary sociologist. He further maintained that a purely external critique without a 
normative component of what should be done is useless, for it cannot be really applied to 
legal practice. 15 He added that to change the law, it requires positive jurisprudence.  
 The solution then is for CLS to seek and not disregard a foundation that is strong 
enough and supported with normative claims. Deconstructing the foundational thinking in 
law seems to be a failed attempt because in each case there is a retreat to foundations of 
anew but unworkable sort.  
External and Internal viewpoint 
Externality of law is the view that tends to take a third-person (observer’s) view of the legal 
system. This is in contrast with the internal view, which includes legal practitioners: 
lawyers, judges, legislators. 16 The external view of law looks at the big picture; it answers 
                                                          
14 Ibid. p. 985  
15 Ibid. p. 986 
16 Ibid. p. 931 
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the larger question of ideology. It may be argued that this kind of approach is as essential 
as the internal viewpoint; however, it is also seen as rather irrelevant. According to 
Dworkin, “theories that ignore the structure of legal argument for supposedly larger 
questions of history and society are therefore perverse. They ignore questions about the 
internal character of legal argument, so their explanations are impoverished.” 17 Generally, 
an excessively external viewpoint in law is irrelevant, and it does not categorically affect 
legal institution. Conversely, according to Alan Hunt, a CLS scholar:  
The dominant tradition of contemporary legal theory is epitomized by H.L.A Hart 
and Ronal Dworkin that insists upon the adoption of an internalist perspective. It 
exhibits predisposition to adopt the self-descriptions of judges or lawyers as 
primary empirical material. There is thus a naïve acceptance of legal ideology as 
legal reality. Internal theory is simply too close to its subject matter.18      
 
Hunt’s point revolves around the warrant that legal practitioners, as a rational individual 
part of a certain society, have their own biases. It includes all external factors that influence 
the judging process like gender and class. This is one of the main assertions purported by 
the CLS scholars as their grounds on their claim of ‘law as politics’, which will be further 
discussed on the next chapter.  
Legal Realism  
Many theories claim that CLS was rooted from the Legal Realism’s legacy because of their 
almost similar doctrines. There is a general claim or a popular belief that CLS is a 
maturation of legal realism.19 The challenge to the classical legal claim that legal reasoning 
                                                          
17 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) p. 14 
18 Alan Hunt,  “The Critique of Law: “What is ‘Critical’ about Critical Legal Theory?”, Journal of Law and 
Society Vol. 14 No. 1. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1987.  p. 14  
19 Guyora Binder, “Critical Legal Studies”, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. D. 
Patterson, ed., 2010; Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-023. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1932927 
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was separated and autonomous from moral and political discourse, was then used further 
and improved by the Critical Legal Studies. As part of the main influences of CLS, a review 
on the most prominent forerunners of American Legal Realist thought, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr.’s The Common Law will help. This is the book where the legal realists found 
its battle cry where it commenced the most famous aphorism: “The life of the law has not 
been logic; it has been experience.”20 This aphorism, together with whole book itself, 
created various discussions and debates whether it is a denunciation of all efforts to 
exemplify law as science, or an attack to the orthodox conception of law as a coherent 
system of fixed axioms from which particular rules and decisions could be deduced.  
The main goal for legal realism and CLS seems similar, but the problem comes 
from their historical background. Jeffrey Standen claimed that CLS is actually not of a 
legal realist decent, but of an anti-positivist influence. In “Critical Legal Studies as an Anti-
Positivist Phenomenon”, Standen notes that the CLS approach to law traces its lineage back 
to the natural law tradition of ancient Greece and Rome. He further contends that in both 
its philosophy and its methodology, CLS stands not as an extension of legal realism but as 
its antithesis.21 This creates the difference between the two schools. Legal Realism has 
based its critique on a positivist belief that law and morals are separate; whereas CLS is 
based on Natural Law. This also creates another weakness on the part of CLS because of 
the weak historical foundation from Classical Natural Law, which will be dealt with in the 
third chapter.  
                                                          
20 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963) p. 
5 
21 Jeffrey A. Standen, “Critical Legal Studies as an Anti-Positivist Phenomenon”, Virginia Law Review. 
Vol. 72, No. 5. Aug., 1986. p. 983 
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By the early 1990s, the CLS conference had dissolved, yet the CLS movement 
continued its influence on the work of numerous legal scholars in different fields: legal and 
constitutional theory, legal history, labor and employment law, international law, local 
government law, and administrative law.22  
Critical Legal Studies Scholars ‘crits’ 
Consequently, adherents of CLS sought to destabilize traditional conceptions of law, and 
to unravel and challenge existing legal institutions. Over the following two decades after 
the sixties, from the civil rights and feminist movements and even in art, architecture, 
literature, and language, CLS did not leave legal theory untouched. The trend for 
proponents of CLS is mainly of a postmodern attack, meaning CLS attempts to disrupt the 
all-embracing theory of origins and structure of law.  
The Brazilian philosopher, social theorist, and politician, Roberto Unger, leads the 
Critical Legal Studies Movement. They seek to rebuild legal institutions for human equality 
permanently, and not just a temporary truce in a brutal struggle against the legal 
injustices23. They sought to change the traditional views of law and legal doctrine, 
revealing the hidden interests and class dominations in the existing and prevailing legal 
frameworks. As one of the founding members of the movement, most of his works reflect 
the ideology CLS demonstrates.  
                                                          
22 Guyora Binder, “Critical Legal Studies”, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. D. 
Patterson, ed., 2010; Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-023. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1932927 
23 Roberto Unger, Passion: An Essay on Personality (New York: Free Press, 1984) p. 47 
14 
 
 Unger starts with The Universal History of Legal Thought. He relates law as the 
doctrinal quest for normative order, law as the will of the sovereign, and law as the 
unexplained and unjustified structure of society.24 
Unger’s second book is the Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social 
Theory. It is used to examine how his legal theory develops as it is now. It is a study of the 
place of law in societies, and the criticism of social theory. It answers different inquiries 
about law and society, the conditions of different kinds of law, the bases of the rule of law, 
the significance of studying law, social hierarchy and moral vision, the struggles of the rule 
of law, and the lastly, the changes in the legality and legal thought. These are the questions 
that Unger dealt with through a broad range of historical settings.25 Generally, it claims the 
resolution of its internal dilemmas; however, he did not offer a legitimate solution, but 
more of a metaphysical one.  
In The Critical Legal Studies Movement, Unger shows the incongruity of formalism 
and objectivism. He discussed how laws and legal discourse hide the social inequalities 
and political biases that so interest philosophy and revolutionary politics. He first 
maintained the main objection to the approach or view of the critical legal studies 
movement, that “there is a formidable gap that suggests between the reach of their 
intellectual and political commitments, together with the constraints upon their situation.” 
26  
                                                          
24 Robert Unger, The Universal History of Legal Thought. 
25 Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: The Free 
Press, 1976) 
26 Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) 
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In What Should Legal Analysis Become? Unger argues for the reconstruction of 
legal analysis as a discipline of institutional imagination. He added that changing the 
practice of legal analysis has an effect in re-imagining and reshaping the dominant 
institutions of representative democracy, market economy, and free civil society. The 
search for basic social alternatives, largely abandoned by philosophy and politics, can find 
in such a practice a new point of departure. He then criticized the dominant, rationalizing 
style of legal doctrine, with its obsessional focus upon negotiation and its urge to suppress 
or contain conflict or contradiction in law. Further, he shows how we can turn legal analysis 
into a way of talking about the alternative institutional futures of a democratic society. To 
sum up, the major concern of the book is to search how professional subjects such as legal 
thought can inform the public or the collective down to the masses.27  
 Equally important, a compilation of interviews with the legal intellectuals and 
scholars edited James R. Hackney Jr., Legal Intellectuals in Conversation: Reflections on 
the Construction of Contemporary American Legal Theory, showed the fundamental 
theoretical questions in legal academe. For the Critical Legal Studies part, Hackney 
interviewed Duncan Kennedy, a Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard Law 
School, and one of the founders of CLS. In the interview, Kennedy stated the difference 
between realist and crits. He claimed that ‘realists had been so committed to policy science 
and policy analysis, which they would preserve the law and politics distinction’, and further 
claiming that ‘they were never able to take their own critique seriously.’28 He shortly 
mentioned the difference between the legal realist and crits. That they are doing a critique 
                                                          
27 Roberto Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? (London; New York: Verso, 1996) 
28 James R. Hackney Jr., Legal Intellectuals in Conversation: Reflections on the Construction of 
Contemporary American Legal Theory (New York: New York University Press, 2012) p. 27 
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against the legal realist stand with regards to analysing policy. The main difference that he 
added is that legal realists are not getting rid of the formalism. He added that CLS have 
something that is hard to substitute, which is ‘rational policy thinking’.29 However, on this 
claim, there is no clear definition or explanation of the so-called rational policy thinking.  
 Brian Tamanaha, has another approach with CLS. In his article The Failure of Crits 
and Leftist Law Professors to Defend Progressive Causes, he mentioned an economic 
problem that might explain one of the CLS movement’s major themes – the legal system 
is largely built by elites. Tamanaha introduced the pricing structure of legal education that 
shows an intense class implication, for the tuition is too high for the middle and working 
class. 30  Consequently, this creates an economic barrier, therefore placing the elites in 
higher legal positions.   
Duncan Kennedy also maintained Tamanaha’s claim of economic inequality in the 
legal education. Kennedy further stated that one of the major goal of CLS was to transform 
legal education. Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, self-published as a 
pamphlet in 1982, is Kennedy’s critique of the American legal education. In it, he argues 
that American legal education reinforces class, race, and gender inequality. He argued that 
everything about law school: curriculum, course material, teaching styles, grading system, 
class ranking, treatment of secretaries, how people dress and talk, on-campus hiring 
system, etc. “train students to accept and participate in the hierarchical structure of life in 
law.”31 Kennedy further argued that because of these, the educators must take ‘personal 
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Washington University in St. Louis, School of Law. p. 315 
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responsibility’ for the legal hierarchy for the legal education per se is a crucial part of 
perpetuating the system.32  
CLS Major Themes and thoughts  
As introduced earlier, the CLS scholars as a whole do not offer a monolithic body of 
thought, but several common themes can be traced in its members’ works. First, there is 
the idea that all ‘law is politics’. This means that legal decisions are not legal at all, for they 
are political. It takes aim at the positivist idea that law and politics is separated. Given their 
claim of the politics in law, there is a usual strand for CLS scholars that law tends to serve 
the interests of the wealthy and the powerful by protecting them against the demands of 
the poor and subaltern: women, ethnic minorities, working class, disabled, and 
homosexuals. Generally, they all argue that law is used as tool for the elite’s protection.  
Critical theorists argue that actual judges and legislatures produce predictable 
results. These results, mostly, are tilted towards the benefit of the elite. As Morton Horwitz 
argued, since 19th century courts changed legal rules to spur economic competition and 
assists the elite merchants for power and wealth.33 Also as early as 19th century to 20th 
century, courts remade and repealed property rules to permit owners to exclude people 
from access to commercial and other enterprise business mainly for racial reasons.34 As 
stated by Alan Freeman, law reforms implemented are at the perspective of the perpetrators 
themselves rather than the perspective of the victim. It is given the idea that the ones who 
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are placed, appointed, and are able to be on the legal realm are the elite, again using law as 
their tool for protection.  
Most CLS scholars seek to demonstrate historical, socioeconomic, and 
psychological analyses to identify how these particular groups and institutions benefit from 
legal decisions.35 They also want to expose how the legal analysis and legal culture mystify 
outsiders; moreover, making it work to make legal results seem legitimate.36  
In addition, CLS also claims that individuals’ decisions are based on reason that is 
attached to political, social, or economic constraints. Therefore, law practitioners do not 
really create a decision solely based on the law, but it is influenced by their political, social, 
and economical factors down to even their current state while deciding. For instance, 
external factors like weather, his or her breakfast, socio-economic class, gender, race, and 
all other conditions of life, affect the judge’s decision in a certain case. Duncan Kennedy, 
one of the most noted proponents, acknowledges that these stated psychological and social 
dimensions of judicial roles exists as a constraint for the legal adjudication.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LEGAL INDETERMINACY AND POLITICS 
 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) main assertion 
of legal indeterminacy. Here we shall state that it is only grounded on ambiguity and 
confusion about the legal process and decision. Particularly, it is also founded on the 
confusion of inherent generality of laws as contradictory, incoherent, and vague. 
Furthermore, this chapter also refutes the CLS claim of ‘law is politics’ as their grounds 
for positing legal indeterminacy.    
Contrary to the critical scholars’ claim of laws being indeterminate, this paper 
offers an account and proof for law’s determinacy through an overarching principle of a 
legal formalist logic and language. This paper comprises the sub-arguments that will 
support the main assertion of legal formalism that includes inherent generality of legal 
language, reasoned elaboration, and neutral principle.     
The focus of this paper revolves around the idea of legal indeterminacy, which 
states that contrary to the common understanding, legal materials, statutes and case law, do 
not really answer legal disputes.  
Legal principles and doctrines, CLS scholars claim, are said to be indeterminate in 
two ways. First, the legal rules in force contain substantial gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities. 
They maintained that these existing gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities are not anomalies or 
exceptions, but are widely present even in simple cases. Second, legal indeterminacy also 
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rises because of the underlying norms that include stability and predictability, and also 
fairness and utility. 37  
Furthermore, CLS theorists do not claim that legal indeterminacy branched out 
because of the absence of structure. Alternatively, they argue that legal indeterminacy 
results from specific kinds of structure that run throughout law.  
 To demonstrate the indeterminacy of legal doctrines, some critical scholars used 
the methods of semiotics. They used it to deconstruct theories, and further unearth a deep 
structure of categories and tensions about the legal system as a whole. For instance, Duncan 
Kennedy maintained that various legal doctrines revolve around a structure of binary pairs 
of opposing concepts: self and other, private and public, subjective and objective, freedom 
and control.38 39 For Kennedy, such pairs limit the legal doctrines to two sides only. Further, 
he maintained that this is a manifestation of the indeterminacy of legal doctrines as it 
developed through history.  
 Kennedy also argued that instead of replicating existing social power relations, 
classrooms could be an arena for political analysis and struggle. He claimed further that 
law schools should expose the indeterminacy of legal doctrine. They need to teach law 
students to unbundle and reframe legal arguments on behalf of those with less power. 40   
According to some critical scholars, most existing legal theories are too committed 
to the law being determinate, objective, and neutral. The problem, according to them, is that 
neither of these ideals can be obtain in legal practice. ‘Law is neither, objective, nor 
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40 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy. p.591 
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neutral.’41 Critical scholars have been especially critical of law’s claim to objectivity. 
Looking into most works of critical scholars, they developed extensive arguments 
concluding that law is radically indeterminate, incoherent, and contradictory. Critical 
scholars maintain that the areas of law embody conflicting principles that cannot be 
balanced.42 The principles and counter-principles are manifestation of larger social visions 
or “prescriptive conceptions of society” which are themselves inconsistent.43 Some critical 
scholars claim that unresolvable conflicts arise in nearly every case.44 In addition, according 
to CLS, law is indeterminate to the extent that legal questions lack single right answers.  
Furthermore, the concept of ‘law is politics’ is one of their main grounds to their 
claim of legal indeterminacy. Since the 1920s, Legal Realism started to develop the 
indeterminacy argument. It was then revised and updated in the 1980s by the proponents 
of the CLS movement to serve as their spearhead. Then, they employed this argument to 
claim that the rule of law was a myth designed to maintain the illegitimate domination of 
society by the economically and politically powerful or the elites.45  
Legal formalism 
This thesis uses the main principles of a legal formalist logic and language as its main 
assertion. Legal formalism is a theory that legal rules stand separate from other social and 
political institutions.46 According to this theory, once lawmakers produce rules, judges 
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apply them to the facts  of a case without regard to social interests and public policy. 47 
Lawrence Solum describes it as commitment to a set of ideas that more or less includes: 48
(1) The law consists of rules.  
(2) Legal rules can be meaningful.  
(3) Legal rules can be applied to particular facts.  
(4) Some actions accord with meaningful legal rules; other actions do not.  
(5) The standard for what constitutes following a rule vel non can be publicly 
knowable. 
 
Legal formalism started around the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.49 It was 
the era of the “classical legal consciousness”50 where they view judicial decision-making 
as “a scientific, deductive process by which preexisting legal materials subsume particular 
legal cases under their domain, thus allowing judges to infer the antecedently existing right 
answer to the case at bar.”51 Therefore, it is implied, using this formalistic approach, that 
judges decide cases objectively and impersonally by logically deducing the correct 
resolution from a definite and consistent body of legal rules. Thus, the judge did not make 
the law; rather, he or she merely applied the law that had been created by the legislature.   
The possibility of using a deductive process of resolving a legal case has been clearly 
described as follows: 
Predominant legal theory claimed that reasoning proceeded syllogistically from 
rules and precedents that had been clearly defined historically and logically, 
through the particular facts of a case, to a clear decision. The function of a judge 
was to discover analytically the proper rules and precedents involved and to apply 
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50 Elizabeth Mensch, “The History of Mainstream Legal Thought”, The Politics of Law, David Kairys ed. 
rev. ed., 1990 p. 13 
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them to the case as first premise. Once he or she had done that, the judge could 
decide the case with certainty and uniformity. 52 
Further, another illustration of how the act of legal reasoning can be shown in structure to 
pure deduction:  
Every judicial act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction. The figure 
of its reasoning is the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts, a finding that the 
facts of the particular case are those certain facts and the application of the rule is 
a logical necessity. The old syllogism, “All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, and 
therefore he is mortal”, states the exact form of a judicial judgment. The existing 
rule of law is: Every man who with malice aforethought kills another in the peace 
of the people is guilty of murder. The defendant with malice aforethought killed 
A.B. in the peace of the people; therefore, the defendant is guilty of murder.53 
 
Therefore, it may be established that the language of judicial decision is mainly the 
language of logic. Then, given the logical method and form, it may also be concluded that 
it is founded also of certainty. Consequently, this possibility denies the claim of critical 
theorist judges cannot produce a certain answer or decision. In addition, this kind of legal 
reasoning also provides certainty, stability, and predictability to the law.  
Inherent generality of laws 
Another concern for the critical theorist is the vagueness of language used in legal rules 
e.g. ‘reasonable’, ‘due process’, ‘fair value’ etc. However, their claim of legal 
indeterminacy as founded on the vagueness of language is simply a confusion with the 
inherent generality of legal language. Laws are inherently general. It is to allow the legal 
practitioners in reading it as broadly or as narrowly as necessary to achieve a desired result. 
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In addition, it will be irrational to claim that all laws are supposed to be specific to 
be applied on each legal cases, for it will never and cannot reflect the exact reality of events 
that happen in a certain society in which it is applied. That is to say, with the complexities 
of events, crimes, definitions, individuals, etc. laws exist to be general and overlapping for 
it to match the complexities to which it is to be applied. According to Hart, laws are 
supposed to be general for better application.54 Codes and rules are composed of general 
provisions from enforcement, application, and penalties. He further claimed that the law is 
coherent, clear, and discoverable in most cases.55 He specifically argues that the legal rules 
are necessarily worded in generalities so that they will apply to a broad variety of cases. 
This leaves an ‘open texture’ quality of rules for an element of judicial discretion in cases 
where law is unclear.56    
In The Concept of Law, Hart maintains that there are some cases in which the rules 
of the legal system do not clearly specify the correct legal outcome.57 Hart claims, 
“Penumbra of uncertainty” is derived from the vagueness and open texture of the legal 
language.58 The judges apply existing rules created by the legislature. Take note that judges 
apply rules for adjudication, not just a single rule. Given the existence of pluralistic events, 
the penumbra of uncertainty and the open texture of the legal rules or legal language as 
whole is crucial. For Hart, the indeterminacy of law is a peripheral or an outlying 
phenomenon in a system of rules, which provide specific outcomes to cases.59   
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For instance, a quick analysis of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines or the 
Act No. 381560 will help in illustrating legal codes’ generality. In its first book, it is initially 
stated that it will use general provisions with its date of enforcement and application, 
together with its offenses, liabilities, and penalties. Laws are made specific only on the note 
of its articles and sub-articles. The problem, perhaps, rises from the vague terms on its 
defining article. In the example, the key term that needs to be defined is ‘deceit’. According 
to Article 3 – Definitions, ‘felonies’ are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but 
also by means of fault (culpa). Further, it defined deceit as when the act is performed with 
deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, 
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. This act shows that in general, it corresponds 
to all acts of felonies by deceit and fault, and at the same it also corresponds to a more 
specific case through the extension stated through its sections. The existence of vague 
terms does not necessarily suggest the indistinctness of law, but it shows the inherent 
generality of the legal language. These kinds of gaps are for judges to fill in; however, it 
may be debatable that judges may tend to fill in these gaps in accordance to his or her bias 
therefore making the law not neutral at all.  
Moreover, another concern is the idea of ‘precedence’. The term precedence in the situation 
of legal institution may mean different things. First, it can be about the possibility of a new 
law created with a certain section contradicting or matching an old law. For instance, the 
R.A. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women (MCW)61 and the R.A. 10354 or the 
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Reproductive Health Law (RH Law)62 is relatively new. The MCW was approved on year 
2007, while the RH Law on 2012. The   former , as it recognize the realities that affect the 
former, as it recognize the realities that affect the women’s condition, promotes 
comprehensive plans, policies, programs, measures, and mechanisms to address 
discrimination and inequality in all aspects of life of women. The latter, which mainly 
focuses on reproductive health, still stated and allotted a section against discrimination that 
already exists on the precedent laws passed. The problem with these is the legitimacy of 
what law is to be cited: the new or the precedent. The response is the newer law is more 
updated, therefore it is more valid. However, this does not remove the legitimacy of the 
precedent or the older law, for given in the example, some certain sections of the RH Law 
point towards the MCW for a more comprehensive focus on gender discrimination. 
Moreover, this kind of example shows that precedence always drive on the new and 
updated act, but this does not claim illegitimacy on the previous act. These kinds of 
complications were answered by the court postulation that the legislature was implicitly or 
explicitly implicating that it repeals the older law. Again, the said complications on the old 
and new laws do not entail law as indeterminate. 
Second, since the Philippines has a hybrid of common and civil law legal system, 
a precedent is a principle or rule established in a previous legal case that is either binding 
for a court or any other tribunal when deciding a certain case with similar issues or facts. 
It is established by following earlier judicial decisions or a system of judicial decisions like 
the Supreme Court Annotated (SCRA) volumes here in the Philippines. SCRAs are the 
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decisions created by previous justices on their previous cases. A certain judge may seek a 
case written comparable to his or her case in need of adjudication; then by knowing the 
previous decision, the judge may come up with his or her own to be considered as a valid 
decision. However, according to the critical scholars, these acts create and generate 
indeterminacy on the part of statutes. Thus, the idea of reviewing SCRAs for judicial 
decisions is not for direct pronouncement, but merely a guide for consistencies.  
Again, legal cases may be comparable, and these similarities can be used for 
consistencies on decisions for easier judicial process.  
Consequently, laws do not really contradict, but they only overlap due to their 
generality. ‘Overlap’ does not necessarily suppose that it ‘contradicts’. The CLS 
conception of contradictory of laws is based on ambiguity, for it may be claimed that their 
stance of contradictory is nothing but laws’ inherent generality.   
Reasoned Elaboration 
Additional argument against the critical theorist’s claim of indeterminate legal decisions is 
the rise of the Legal Process School that is widely associated with materials and thoughts 
developed by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks.63  
 This serves as an explanation against critical scholars’ claim of judicial decisions 
being personal. Within this realm, the legal process theory maintained judges could decide 
cases through the process of ‘reasoned elaboration’. Further, it will answer questions 
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against the indeterminacy of laws through the elaboration of principles and policies 
contained within precedent and legislation.  
As discussed earlier, legal codes and statutes often have general language, but that 
does not that officials should simply interpret this ambiguous language to reflect their own 
political values. Legal practitioners should apply a “general directive arrangement” must 
elaborate the arrangement in a way which is consistent with the other established 
applications of it, and “must do so in a way which best serves the principles and policies it 
expresses.”64  
It may be conceded that judges have their own bias in judicial decision-making, 
and that the adjudication is not merely a mechanical deduction from precedents and 
statutory texts. However, with the idea of reasoned elaboration, judges ideally reason from 
legal materials using principles that are neutral together with the defined set of facts. Using 
the legal process concept:   
The integrity of the judicial process may be compromised if the cases that are 
decided on extend further than the case at hand…only by insisting on a level of 
generality, some distance between the reasons and the facts of the case at hand, can 
one be certain that judges are actually reasoning from legal materials rather than 
indulging their own preference.65 
 
Furthermore, according to Hart, the court should focus on applying and interpreting, and 
not on creating laws.66 He added that it is part of the legal duties to develop a “reasoned 
application of basic principle” to a certain case.67 He maintained that a court should base 
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its action, not on a free judgment of relative social advantage, but on the reasoned 
development of authoritative starting-points i.e. statutes, prior judicial decisions.68 Besides, 
creating or modifying the existing statutes to come up with a decision will result to fading 
of written laws, since it will not be used appropriately. 
Therefore, the problem of indeterminacy is not really plaguing the concept of law per se. 
Nevertheless, the problem seems to be derived on the way judges interpret laws. It may be 
conceded that, in reality, judges do in fact make decisions based on their political bias. 
However, laws can be neutral with its inherent generality. As maintained by Wechsler, 
courts can make such determinations based on the type of ‘reasoned explanation’ with 
intrinsic judicial action.69 He added that if judges would decide cases strictly on the basis 
of such neutral principles rather than being result driven, judicial decision could be both 
extracted determinate and politically neutral.70 Courts should respect legal procedures and 
materials, carefully consider the arguments of both parties, and justify the result with an 
honest and reasoned judicial opinion that provides a reasoned elaboration of the purposes 
behind the law being interpreted.71 
 In addition, Dworkin also added that by correctly identifying the ‘best’ 
interpretation of these materials, judges are and can be able to render determinate outcomes 
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to legal controversies even in those cases in which appeal to the rules alone would provide 
ambiguous results.72  
Institutionalized System 
Every judicial and legislative institution has its own protocol. It is composed of system, 
framework, and protocols. For instance, in the Philippines, the court system is composed 
of Review Courts, Trial Courts, and Special Courts like Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, 
Sharia Courts.73 These variety of courts are laddered with hierarchy. Each court has their 
own obligations and responsibilities depending on the type of the case. This is where the 
idea of judicial review rises. If an individual wants to make an appeal, his or her case will 
be transferred to a higher court for another review, assuming that it will be accepted for 
reopening of case.  
These institutionalized systems creates a stronger foundation of the legal system; 
therefore, making law more determinate and stable.  
‘Law is politics’  
One of the main premise for CLS claim of legal indeterminacy is their claim of ‘law is 
politics’. The critical scholars’ claim of ‘law is politics’ is founded on the idea that since 
laws are written, implemented, and decided by predominantly Christian, white, males –
then laws are ‘political’. They mainly criticized the law through this argument, further 
maintaining that this adds up to the reason why the law is indeterminate.  
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This thesis acknowledges the existence of political bias of legal practitioners from 
the creation, implementation, and judicial extension of laws. However, the claim that ‘law 
is politics’ is excessive. It may be true that there is politics in law, but law is not purely 
politics. ‘Law is politics’ is the same form as ‘A is B’. Therefore, it proposes identity 
between the two different concepts. Furthermore, the claim overly reduces law as purely a 
political entity, which it is not.  
Politics exists in every part of society. The law is part of society as a human artifact 
and it is also tainted with politics. Laws cannot stand on their own, for legal practitioners 
interpret them. Using the definition of ‘politics’ as power, the politics of law indeed exists. 
However, the taint of politics came from the legal practitioners, and not on the notion of 
law itself. It only serves as a tool, for the individuals, as the critical scholars claim, the 
elites. The existence of politics in law does not necessarily cause indeterminacy of laws. 
Counterexamples will help refute the claim that ‘law is politics’, and it is the 
developments that happened in legal system. For instance, societies used laws to legitimate 
developments for social justice. The best example is the changes about slavery in different 
societies. Others may argue that slavery still exists, but the developments since the ancient 
times until now are pronounced. The elites prominently benefited with slavery, and laws 
were used to halt these discriminations.  
Another example is the constitution. The constitution is committed to social and 
distributive justice. Using the 1987 Philippine Constitution74, it has articles that directly 
address human rights through Article 3 Bill of Rights. In this article, from Section 1 to 
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Section 22, it addresses every right of an individual – life, liberty, property, privacy, 
freedom, equal protection of the laws, etc. The Article 13 was even dedicated to social 
justice and human rights. In addition, the government distributes wealth using taxation laws 
like the National Internal Revenue Code75, Tariff and Customs Code76, and Real Property 
Tax Code77. It may be claimed that deprived citizens still exists, but this taxation laws’ 
primary goal was to redistribute wealth through government projects that everyone in 
society can use.  
The problem with this criticism of law as a legal theory is that it merely states the 
current political state of law. It does not add any strong point to the indeterminacy of law, 
for the problem only lies on the collective and not on the notion of law itself.  
CLS’ Response 
Given the stated arguments on this chapter, a contemporary critical scholar may offer the 
following response:   
First, a critical scholar may respond to the critics of CLS through claiming that they 
are part of a certain society, therefore they are also blinded or in denial of being affected 
by politics and dominant ideology of their epoch. This is comparable to the idea false 
consciousness in Marxist ideology where the masses are not aware of the oppression. 
However, this response may be also used against the critical scholars since they are 
likewise part of that certain society affected by a dominant ideology.  
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Fernando’s idea on internal and external perspective of law may be used for this 
issue since it involves different characters with these two different approach or view 
towards law. Critical scholars may be guilty of being too external in looking into or 
analyzing the legal system. Likewise, critics of CLS and other legal philosophers from 
other schools of thought e.g. Legal Positivism, Classical Natural Law are also guilty of 
viewing the legal system with merely an internal perspective. Therefore, in creating a 
critique of the legal system, there should be a hybrid experience and approach – both 
external and internal perspective – in order to provide a comprehensive view of the legal 
system.   
Second concern is with the issue regarding the degree of how politics affects law. 
If perhaps a certain critical scholar recreated or revamped their excessive and identical 
claims that law is politics into law merely affected by politics, then it will remove the 
excessiveness of their claim. However, using their idea of politics, it still does not really 
offer a sturdy support towards indeterminacy of law. Even if law is affected by politics, it 
does not entail that it is not determinate and legitimate. 
Still, the notion of bias exists. Critical scholars may respond that given the existing 
bias, judicial decisions are tainted. They may argue that the existence of bias is inherent to 
every individual. Those individuals implicitly and unintentionally use their bias on every 
decision and choice they take, for it is essential innate for every individual. Therefore, 
judicial decisions are all politically tainted with bias. However, the problem with this kind 
of response is the excessive reduction of law to judicial decisions only. Law is a larger 
institution – a human artifact. It cannot be merely condensed to legal process and decisions. 
With regards the inherent existence of bias or prejudice, as stated earlier on this chapter, 
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the idea of reasoned elaboration, neutral principles, and institutionalized systems and 
protocols will help in decreasing, if not completely eliminate, prejudice. Through 
mechanical deduction, judicial decisions can be impartial and balanced as possible. 
Legitimacy of laws  
The CLS claims of legal indeterminacy do not necessarily result to illegitimacy. 
Legitimacy may not be the only factor why legal determinacy is important, but it is the 
most significant feature of law. If CLS could show that the legal system is indeterminate 
and therefore illegitimate, then it is powerful. To further demonstrate, a logical structure of 
the assumptions and claims of CLS to the existing liberal legal theory follows:78  
1) Citizens have consented to rules duly enacted by legislature and are therefore 
obligated to obey them. 
2) When judges apply legislative rules, citizens are obligated to obey those 
decisions in consequence of  
3) All judicial decisions are applications of duly enacted statutes.  
4) Therefore, citizens are obligated to obey judicial decisions  
5) Thus, making laws legitimate. 
 
Again, regardless of laws being legally indeterminate as the critical theorists’ claim, 
legitimacy plays a more vital role to law. The determinacy or indeterminacy of law does 
not necessarily dictate if a law will be legitimate or not. Even if the CLS will be successful 
in the future in proving that laws are essentially indeterminate, it does not completely 
bombard the law’s core, which is its legitimacy.   
                                                          
78 Ken Kress, “Legal Indeterminacy”, California Law Review Vol. 77 No. 283, 1989. p.288  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Critical Legal Studies’ (CLS) main assertion of legal indeterminacy is only based on 
ambiguity and confusion about the legal process and decision. Their claim of legal 
indeterminacy is founded on the confusion of inherent generality of laws as contradictory, 
incoherent, and ambiguous.  
Since CLS is a postmodern legal theory, the weaknesses of the postmodern 
approach may also be considered. First is the postmodernist external approach that creates 
a gap in interpreting laws. They are merely criticizing the legal system without a 
systematized framework of how to start and overturn the ideas they want to overturn. 
Second is its antifoundationalist character wherein critical scholars tend to use the concepts 
they ridicule. They disregard normative principles, and use another foundation of an 
unworkable sort.  
The critical scholars’ claim of legal indeterminacy has been refuted by this paper’s 
claim of inherent generality of the legal language for better application and interpretation 
– further showing that their claim of contradictory laws are not contradictions, but inherent 
generality.  
Then, with the use of legal formalism and logic as the legal language, it refutes the 
claim of personal, partial, and subjective legal decisions. Together with ‘reasoned 
elaboration’ and neutral principles, and institutionalized systems and protocols, it shows 
that laws are capable and indeed clear, objective, neutral, and determinate.
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Concerning the main reason for the CLS claim of legal indeterminacy – law is 
politics – this thesis showed the claim is excessive, for law is not purely politics. It offered 
counterexamples further maintaining that laws can be used for the good of the many 
through legal statues and codes for the development of society. It may be true that there is 
political bias from the creation, implementation, and judicial extension, but the law per se 
is inherently objective, impartial, and determinate. The claim – law is politics – is merely 
a statement of a problem in a certain society. It is not a decent ground for claiming legal 
indeterminacy; therefore, they failed to maintain a strong stand about the indeterminacy of 
law.  
Legal legitimacy is the most important factor for a law to be a law. Consequently, 
the CLS claim of legal indeterminacy does not potently result to illegitimacy of law. CLS, 
as a legal theory, failed to show that their claim of indeterminacy would essentially cause 
the law to be meaningless artifact of society.  
Further, their goal of overturning the hierarchical structures of domination in the 
modern society’s legal institution is also problematic, for they are offering an indirect and 
difficult solution through eradicating the capitalist and elitist society. But then again, with 
an internal translation of their works partnered with a strong foundation, it will be possible.  
Given the radical and postmodern approach, the CLS critique of the legal system is 
essentially a critical legal theory that entails the betterment of the society. It may be hard 
to analyze CLS because of its lack of a systematic framework, but their method and 
approach may serve as an example for the members of society and the good of the legal 
system. It further encourages an individual to come up with his or her own way of looking 
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into the legal institution. As a member of society, there is a need to work out ways in which 
the collective can live amicably and harmoniously with the existence of a legitimate law. 
Overall, CLS may have failed in showing the indeterminacy of law, but they can 
be successful in showing the behind flaws of law. Given the possible weaknesses, CLS, as 
a legal theory, can still be used as viable alternative theory to the advancement and benefit 
of the jurisprudential future.  
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